


Safety and Security Aspects of Ethernet and TSN

Borislav Nikolić

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Focus on Automotive Domain







- Automotive trends Past, Present and Future
- Automotive Ethernet & TSN
- Safety Aspects
- Security Aspects
- Conclusions






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Automotive trends – Past & Present




Envisioned 21st Century Vehicles (1950s perspective)



itu BS

Automotive trends – Future







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Why Ethernet in the Automotive Domain?


Ever-increasing requirements of current and future functionalities:

- High throughput infotainment
- Low (guaranteed) latencies
- Fault-tolerance

Ethernet benefits:


- **Bandwidth**: 100Mb/s \rightarrow 1Gb/s \rightarrow 10Gb/s \rightarrow ...
- Open network capabilities
- Shared technology cost (no ownership issues)
- Huge engineering experience (avionics, industry)
- Ethernet → communication backbone
- Ethernet is a very promising automotive technology
 - Common view: Ethernet most likely candidate for mono-technological network

Sensor fusion Real-time object detection



Ethernet in the Automotive Domain

Envisioned heterogeneous automotive architecture





- frame preemption (IEEE 802.1Qbu)
- stream filtering (IEEE 802.1Qci)
- time triggering (IEEE 802.1Qbv)
- frame replication & elimination (IEEE 802.1CB)

Ethernet TSN

Frame Preemption (IEEE 802.1Qbu)

- Reduces blocking time of lower-priority frames
- Allows preemptions of lower-priority frames (at certain points)
- Per-Stream Filtering and Policing (IEEE 802.1Qci)
 - Ensure that streams stay within pre-defined bounds (fault containment)
- Timing and Synchronisation (IEEE 802.1AS-rev*)
 - Extensions to 802.1AS: redundancy, multiple time domains

Time Triggering (IEEE 802.1Qbv)

- Time-aware shaper for low latency
- Time slots protected by guard bands

• Frame Replication and Elimination (IEEE 802.1CB)

Increased network resilience to transmission faults via redundancy



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Automotive Ethernet Challenges

Lost inherent support for pub/sub mechanism (switch-based)

Need to use higher-level protocols

Routing necessary

- Point-to-point communication with dynamic address handling
- Different switch scheduling mechanisms, flow control

Different communication schemes


Unicast, multicast, broadcast

Freedom from interference

How does Ethernet achieve this goal?




Safety Aspects of Current Automotive Networks





Apply similar techniques


- Assign priority/preemption classes according to criticality
- Utilise shaping where necessary
- Time-triggering
- Support combinations



But is the isolation effective?



Ethernet Switch Structure



Ethernet Switch Challenges

Forwarding table

- Limited index space leads to indexing conflicts
 - Loss of timing → interference
- Thoughtful MAC address management required


Queuing buffers

- Limited buffer space
 - Packet drop → interference
- Flow control

iTU

- Same-priority blocking, increased delay & buffer
- Few queues → few priorities
 - Head of line blocking → interference
- Queuing effects require system-level end-to-end analysis


| program&data | | | |
|------------------|--|--|--|
| forwarding table | | | |
| queueing buffers | | | |



Gateway Safety Aspects (CAN \rightarrow Ethernet scenario)

Complex protocol choices


- SOME/IP UDP IP MAC
- TCP IP MAC
- Packaging is additional source of interference



Gateway Safety Aspects (CAN → Ethernet scenario)


Signal grouping:

- By destination minimise multicast overhead
- By priority (e.g. CAN ID) enable QoS for different traffic classes
- By period or deadline minimise sampling delay



Gateway Safety Aspects (CAN → Ethernet scenario)


- Transmission triggering:
 - Buffer timeout (AUTOSAR)
 - Frame is sent periodically
 - No interference
 - Buffer full event (AUTOSAR)
 - Frame transmitted if buffer full
 - Interference
 - Trigger frames (AUTOSAR)
 - Immediate release of certain frames
 - Interference
 - Per-frame timeout
 - Send upon individual frame timeout





Standard does <u>not</u> prevent out of order transmission of frames

- Key "unlock lock" commands, sensor inputs
- Order preservation must be manually implemented \rightarrow interference






iTU

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Standard does not prevent acceptance interval misconfiguration

• Possible dropping of valid frames \rightarrow interference



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
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Standard does not provide rigorous fault detection mechanism

- Periodic latent fault test routine
- Works on the level of estimates, "guesses"
- Coverage issues





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Propagation of fault information not addressed

- Mechanism needed to timely inform controlling entities about faults
- Paramount for fail-operational behaviour



Plethora of configuration and misconfiguration opportunities

- MAC address management
- Switch management
- Protocol selection
- Gateway packaging strategies

TSN increases the feature set


- Standardisation addresses compatibility, does <u>not</u> limit variety
- Some additions seem similar to AVB (ATS former UBS)
- Increased protocol and circuit complexity as well as switch cost
- Are all TSN features useful?
- Standardised does not necessarily mean safe "out of the box"
- Thoughtful application & systematic approaches required!



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Automotive trends – Future





- Security Goals:
 - Confidentiality Protection against unauthorised access to functions and/or information
 - Integrity Correctness of data and system functions
 - Availability Functions and information are available whenever needed
- Properties:
 - Trade-off effort/cost vs level of achieved security level
 - Continuous activity, degrades over time, needs updates
 - Overheads of security measures
- Until few years ago, security not the main concern in Automotive domain
 - First and last talk at AN'17 about security
 - Still gaining increasing amount of attention



- Automotive vehicles = highly communicating "software on wheels"
- External systems and networks:
 - Enable sophisticated functionalities
 - But also increase risk!
- External threats:
 - Attacks and intrusions via communication:
 - WIFI, V2V, V2I, Charging stations, mobile device, app. centers
 - Cloud and Edge computing
- Internal threats:
 - Misbehaving & malicious software
 - Not all features thoroughly tested

Mechanisms to protect against both types of threats necessary

forge privacy violation loss of data manipulate airbag control

disrupt engine

control

clone key

steal ca

parts

Cc

loss of IF


Source: Dr. Christian Meineck @ AN'17

display wrong

warnings


sensors

- Attack Examples via 802.1CB:
 - Exploiting Acceptance Interval






- Attack Examples via 802.1CB:
 - Exploiting Acceptance Interval
 - Exploiting Elimination Mechanism






- Security Measures:
 - Separation
 - Build internal security zones
 - Separate internal from external traffic
 - Minimise external connections
 - Use 802.1Q to classify traffic
 - Filtering






IEEE 802.1Qci Security Aspects

- Protection Against:
 - Bandwidth Violation
 - Malfunctioning
 - Malicious Attacks
- Decisions on a per-stream basis
- Stream Filter
 - Filters, Counters
- Stream Gate
 - Open or Closed
 - Can be time-scheduled
- Meter
 - Bandwidth Profile
 - Red / Yellow / Green Marking






- Security Measures:
 - Separation
 - Authentication, Encryption
 - Hop-by-hop vs End-to-end
 - Encryption layer
 - Encrypted information
 - Encryption vs Integrity checks
 - Protection of all vs selected traffic



- **MDSC** = Metadat Stream Cypher (TTTech)
 - SAFURE Project
 - End-to-end encryption
 - Applied on Layer 2
 - Compatible with TTEthernet



MDSC Frame



Welcome to


SAFURE - Safety And Security By Design For Interconnected Mixed-Critical Cyber-Physical Systems

SAFLIDE targets the design of cyber physical systems by implom ting a methodology that ensures safety and security "by construction". This methodology is enabled by a ework developed to extend system capabilities to control the concurrent effects of security threats on the system behaviour.

SAFURE addressed the security of safety-critical cyber-physical systems by implementing a holistic approach to safety and security by construction, limiting the impact of security on safety when using common shared resources such as networks and processors, preserving the system from attacks that could affect the overall system safety.

At the base of the SAFURE solution is the development of a set of extensions of tools and system capabilities (referred to as the reference SAFURE Framework) able to ent, detect and protect possible vulnerabilities and attacks through efficient system configurations and reconfigurations, keeping critical subsystems within their safety and security boundaries, without inflicting performance impairments for best-effort applications.


This framework extends system capabilities to preserve the system integrity from time starvation, massive energy dissipation and data corruption, seamle security requirements into safety systems in a way that has never been done before. These extensions are applicable from design and development stages to application syment and execution on multi-core chips and high performance distributed systems. The extended analysis methods, development tools and execution capabilities provided by the tranework are supported by a set of quidelines (referred to as the SAFURE Methodology) to assist the designer and the developer to





MACsec (IEEE 802.1AE) applied on Layer 2

- "... allows authorized systems that attach to an interconnect LANs in a network to maintain confidentiality of transmitted data and to take measures against frames transmitted or modified by unauthorized devices."
- Compatible with other IEEE 802.1 standards
- Hop-by-hop
- Relatively simple to implement
- Provides: source authentication, data integrity and data confidentiality
- Protection against: Wiretapping, Impersonation, Masquerading, <u>Man-in-the-Middle</u>, Replay, Denial-of-Service






- In Ethernet and TSN Networks timing very important
- Precision Time Protocol (PTP)
 - IEEE 1588 HW/SW
 - IEEE 802.1AS (-Rev*)
- Attacks on synchronisation may have catastrophic consequences
- Directly Affected Concepts
 - IEEE 802.1Qbv
 - LET (Logical Execution Time) Paradigm


| IMING DIAGRAM FOR | AN EXAMPLE LET TASK | | |
|-------------------|---------------------|---|---------------------------------------|
| release | termination | | preemption interval |
| event | event | | execution interval |
| | \rightarrow t | | output delay |
| period = logical | execution time | 1 | zero time input/ output operations |



Attack scenario (Man-in-the-Middle)








Gateways are sensitive network points

- Single point of failure
- Interfaces between domains, often traffic of diverse nature
- More complex logic and functions than switches
- Packing and triggering strategies particularly exploitable
- Security aspects of GW = relevant topic, requires additional attention





Outline

- Automotive trends Past, Present and Future
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- Conclusions



Conclusions

- Ethernet and TSN = promising automotive networking technologies
- Many opportunities & pitfalls, careful application necessary
- TSN beneficial but not panacea
- Applying standards "out-of-the-box" not always safe
 - Examples AUTOSAR, IEEE 802.1CB
- **Security** relatively new topic in Automotive domain:
 - Gains in importance due to the open-world assumption
 - Better understanding necessary (experience from other domains helpful)
 - Integration with existing and novel technologies necessary
 - Trade-off gains vs overheads
 - Never settle

Keep it simple



Thank you for your attention!

